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1.  Introduction 
After the collapse of the so-called Bubble Economy, the labour market of Japan seems to 
have been changed drastically.  High wages and low unemployment because of the 
structural shortage of workers, and discussions on various social troubles caused by an 
increasing number of illegal workers who are attracted by the Japanese economic boom, 
are things of  the past.  Now, owing to the serious failure of governmental financial 
management, the unemployment rate has reached about 5%, which is the highest since 
1955.  However, it is remarkable that the high unemployment rate has not prevented the 
Japanese people from enjoying their relatively established lifestyle.  Although individuals 
have no chance of becoming regular members of a company after graduation, they can 
gain sufficient wealth to enjoy life by working part-time.  Some middle-aged workers 
have been dismissed because of the recent serious depression, but, on the other hand, 
some younger people voluntarily choose to be unemployed or to support themselves by 
part-time jobs, and wait to obtain much better regular jobs.  The phenomenon during the 
last two years of an increasing number of job offers with a constant unemployment rate 
shows that people in Japan are “luxuriously” particular about their jobs. 
However, both total employment and  the number of  foreign workers are not 
decreasing drastically.  Most legal foreign workers are skilled and their positions are 
threatened by the recent depression, as are those of Japanese citizens.  On the other hand, 
illegal unskilled foreign workers are still engaged in dangerous, gruelling and dirty jobs at 
the bottom of the social pyramid.  As affluent young native people avoid competing with   3
the foreign workers for the unattractive jobs, there is a great demand for unskilled foreign 
workers  in this serious depression.  As a result, the structure of the Japanese l abour 
market has recently developed as follows. There exist three types of natives and legal 
workers, namely, those who succeed  in obtaining  high-wage jobs, those who obtain 
low-wage jobs, and  those  who are unemployed and make their living by obtaining 
unemployment allowances but look for opportunities to obtain high-wage jobs.  On the 
other hand, illegal workers can  obtain low-wage jobs with  lower possibilities of 
unemployment. 
The standard and basic economic analysis of native workers, associated with 
introducing foreign workers, can be summarized as follows.  In  the  case of full 
employment, introducing workers who are perfectly substitutable for natives may reduce 
the wages of native workers because this merely results in increasing the population.  On 
the other hand, introducing workers who are complementary to natives may be much 
better for native workers because the foreign workers, rather than native workers, will 
undertake low-wage jobs.  In the case where there exists unemployment caused by fixed 
wages, the introduction of substitutable workers may have a bad influence because they 
will compete for the limited number of job opportunities.  Introducing complementary 
workers to low-wage jobs may also be harmful to natives who are employed there.  
However, if the  native workers are absorbed  in high-wage jobs by expanding job 
opportunities (although the fixed wage is lower than before), this immigration may be 
beneficial.  Therefore, without considering non-economic factors such as social unrest,   4
complementary workers,  such as illegal immigrants, seem to be preferable to 
substitutable workers, such as legal immigrants, so far as native workers in Japan are 
concerned. 
The pioneering economic study  on  migration  and  unemployment is Harris and 
Todaro (1970).  Ethier (1985), Djajic (1985) and Carter (1999) are remarkable recent 
studies.  Ethier (1985) and Djajic (1985) discuss the economic welfare of the host country 
that confronts the inflow of unskilled foreign workers.  However, these studies, like that 
of Harris and Todaro (1970), attribute the origin of unemployment to fixed wages, so that 
some workers are forced to be unemployed.  On the other hand, Carter (1999) studies the 
economic effects of international migration by applying, for the first time, the efficiency 
wage model adopted by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  In this model, some workers are 
unemployed voluntarily, and Carter discusses the effectiveness of restriction policies on 
the inflow of illegal workers.  However, some subjects in Carter's study remain to be 
considered.  Firstly, it is not clear in Carter (1999) why foreign workers should be illegal.  
Secondly, the possibility of the existence of legal workers is not considered, and, 
therefore, the economic effects of legitimizing illegal workers are not investigated.  To 
examine the optimal immigration policy for Japan with low unemployment, we construct 
our model by modifying the Shapiro and Stiglitz model to accord with the basic static 
model adopted by Milgrom and Roberts (1992).  In our model, both types of foreign 
workers—legal ones who are substitutable  for natives and illegal ones who are 
complementary—exist simultaneously.  Moreover, we modify some of the unreasonable   5
assumptions of Carter (1999) about the Japanese modern economy, namely that some 
illegal workers choose go back to their home country of their own accord and that some of 
them also intend to return to the host country as legal immigrants. 
In Section 2, we show the basic idea of the efficiency wage and the equilibrium of 
the labour market.  Sections 3 and 4 investigate the optimal economic policies to improve 
the economic welfare of natives in two different cases.  In the first case (Section 3), 
restriction policies for illegal workers are quite successful and the number of them is 
sufficiently small.  In the second case  (Section 4), restriction policies  for illegal 
immigrants are almost out of control.  Section 5 contains concluding remarks.  Firstly, we 
show that to improve the economic welfare of the natives, the most effective policy is to 
restrict illegal workers by border or internal enforcement policies when they first arrive.  
Moreover,  introducing legal workers  is a  preferable policy only to reduce the 
unemployment rate of natives.  These conclusions are quite different from those obtained 
by adopting the standard full-employment model or the fixed-wage model, as mentioned 
above.  Secondly, in the case where the restriction of illegal workers is out of control, the 
most preferable policy for natives is to exclude legal workers who are substitutable for 
natives. 
 
2.  Labour Market 
We consider a developed small country that is confronted by the inflow of legal and 
illegal foreign workers.  As in MacDougal (1960), we assume that in this country, only   6
one good is produced with two factors, capital and labour.  We also assume that there are 
two departments of production and  that the same single  good is produced in  each 
department.  We assume that capital is a specific factor in both departments and that 
international capital movements are freely permitted.  On the other hand, any workers 
may be hired in either department.  We take the price of the good as the numeraire. 
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992),  i w  denotes the wage rate of a department 
) 2 , 1 ( = i i .  The government imposes an income tax  t on all employed workers and all of 
the collected taxes are distributed equally to unemployed workers as unemployment 
allowances.  In our model, those who cannot obtain jobs in either department support 
themselves solely with the allowance.  In other words, there are no part-time jobs.  Let  w 
be the per capita unemployment allowance.  Workers intend to shirk if and only if 
shirking is possible and it yields them profit.  Let  i g  be the amount of this profit, which 
includes leisure obtained by going slow during working hours and cash income such as 
bribes.  Let  i p  be the probability of detection of any kind of shirking.  Let  i N  be the 
coefficient of the value of long-term employment, which depends on both the length of a 
worker’s period of hire without detection of shirking, and the interest rate.  If only one 
period of employment is systemized and there is no opportunity of extending one’s period 
of employment, then  1 = i N .  On the contrary, if non-shirking workers can extend their 
contracts of employment, then  i N  would be greater than one. 
Shirking is preferred if 
   7
i i i i N w t w p g ) ( - - >   (1) 
 
is satisfied.  Employers do not have to pay more than necessary to workers, so the 






w t w + = - .  (2) 
 
In Department 1, skilled workers mainly do office work and, therefore, detecting shirking 
by its workers is more difficult and its profit is larger compared with Department 2, 
whose workers are unskilled and engaged in physical jobs.  Under the assumption that 
N N N ” = 2 1  and  2 1 1 2 , g g p p > > , we obtain  2 1 w w > .  This means that the real-wage 
rate in Department 1 is larger than that in Department 2.  If both  2 p  and  2 g  are 
sufficiently large and small, respectively, then the difference between  t w - 2  and  w 
should be very small.  In the case where  2 p  = 1, the advantage of shirking disappears and 
then  w t w = - 2 .  Thus, workers in Department 2 are indifferent to being unemployed.  
This is the “luxurious” unemployment situation mentioned in the Introduction. 
Native workers are hired in both departments.  In Department 1, we assume that all 
foreign workers are legal.  Unlike illegal foreign workers, legal foreign workers have 
enough skills—such as language—to enable them be hired.  Legal foreign workers are 
perfectly substitutable for native workers, and they must pay income taxes, but can also 
obtain unemployment allowances, the same as natives.   8
In Department 2, both types of foreign worker can work, but it is impossible to 
distinguish them from legal workers because illegal workers disguise themselves as legal 
workers.  Employers  must offer common working conditions to all foreign workers.  
Unlike legal foreign workers, illegal ones will be deported to their home country by the 
government of the host country if they are reported to the government on being detected 
by their shirking.  Furthermore, illegal workers can also be deported in accordance with 
the internal enforcement policies adopted by the government.  We use 
* w  to denote the 
wage rate of an illegal foreign worker if he stays in the home country, and q to denote the 
probability of detection by the internal enforcement policy.  The efficiency wage rate that 









+ = ,  (3) 
 
where 
* w  is constant and sufficiently small to satisfy 
*
2 w w > .
1  In this situation, because 
legal foreign workers have the right to accept unemployment allowances, they prefer 
being unemployed to being employed in Department 2  along with  illegal workers.  
Therefore, a legal foreign worker chooses to be unemployed if he fails to  gain 
employment in Department 1. 
Because 
*
2 2 w w > , employers in Department 2 should initially employ low-priced 
foreign workers and later employ additional native workers.  Illegal foreign workers are   9
therefore complementary to native workers because they have no strong preference for 
either department and are prepared to work under severe conditions (they accept quite 
low wage rates which natives and legal workers will not.) 
We consider two possible cases concerning employment in Department 2.  In Case 
1, the total  number of illegal foreign workers is strictly controlled to satisfy 
I L L > 2 , 
where  2 L  denotes the total employment in Department 2 and 
I L  denotes the total 
number of illegal foreign workers, respectively.  All illegal workers are employed in 
Department 2, together with some native workers.  In Case 2, restrictive policies on the 
inflow of illegal immigrants are out of control and satisfy  2 L L
I > .  No native worker is 
employed in Department 2.  Furthermore, the number of illegal foreign workers is too 
large to be absorbed in Department 2 and some are unemployed. 
We note that in Case 1, employers exploit workers by employing illegal workers 
cheaper than natives and each worker is worth 
*
2 2 w w - .  Therefore, employers make a 
total profit of  ) (
*
2 2 w w L
I - .  Under the perfect competition model, it is well known that 
other firms will enter the market until this profit disappears.  The entrants try to poach 
illegal workers from existing firms by offering higher wages than 
*
2 w  and this type of 
competition ends when the illegal workers are employed at the wage rate  2 w , the same as 
that for natives.  However, in our model, we assume that an employer reports illegal 
workers to the government if they resign to work for another employer.  Detection means 
deportation to the home country.  Therefore, the only option for illegal foreign workers is 
to keep working for the first employer, and there is no possibility of their switching jobs.    10
Consequently, employers do not have to pay more than 
*
2 w  to illegal workers.  
 
3.  Case 1: The number of illegal workers is strictly controlled 
Let 
0 L ,
M L , and 
I L  be the total numbers of n ative workers, legal foreign workers and 




1 L L  and 
0
U L  denote  the numbers of native 
workers who are employed in Department 1, employed in Department 2 and unemployed, 
respectively.  Similarly, 
M L1  and 
M
U L  denote the numbers of legal foreign workers who 
are employed in Department 1 and unemployed, respectively. 
Because we assume 
* *
2 w w >  and in our model there are no travel costs and penalty 
fines, in  the  case of free immigration, the total  number of illegal foreign workers 
increases if equation (3) is satisfied.  However, in Case 1, owing to detective efforts by 
employers in Department 2, and  to  internal and border enforcement adopted by the 
government of the host country, the number of illegal foreign workers is controlled to 
satisfy 
I L L > 2 .  Now we may express 
I L  as 
 
0 , 0 , 0 ), , , ( 3 2 1 2 < < < =
I I I I I L L L X q p L L ,  (4) 
 
where  X  is the parameter that indicates the strictness of the border enforcement policy. 
Let  1 L  and  2 L  be the total numbers of workers employed in Departments 1 and 2, 




1 L L L
M = + ,  (5)   11 
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2 L L L




1 L L L L U = + + ,  (7) 
M M
U
M L L L = + 1 .  (8) 
 
Whether a native worker (or a legal foreign worker) will be employed in 
Department 1 or will be unemployed depends only on the law of probability.  Therefore, 










= .  (9) 
 
Concerning the total of  the  unemployment allowances, to satisfy the financial 

















.  (10) 
 
In both departments, we assume that there is perfect competition.  Because of the 
profit-maximizing tendency of firms, wage rates in both departments should be equal to 
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where  2 , 1 ) , ( = i L K F i i i  denotes the production function of a department i.
2 
Now we have twelve equations, (2)–(11).  If  , , , , , , , , , , 2 1 2 1
0 N q p p g g t X L L
M  and 
* w  are exogenously given, then  the  twelve unknowns, 










U  and 
I L  are determined endogenously. 
 
3.1 An increase in the probability of detection 
The effects of an increase in  i p  on the employment and wage rate of native workers are 
as follows: 
 
























dL U ,  (12) 
























dL U .  (13) 
 
The employment of native workers should increase in the department where the 
probability of detection is increased.  In Department 1, the effects of an increase in the 
probability of detection,  1 p , must reduce the wage rate,  1 w .  However, in Department 2, 
the effects of an increase in the probability of detection,  2 p , (which will increase the total 
employment of native workers in this department, 
0
2 L ) may increase the wage rate, 2 w , 
owing to the decrease in the employment of illegal foreign workers.  On the other hand, 
an increase in the probability of detection in one department surely increases the wage   13
rate of another department and reduces the employment of native workers.  In equilibrium, 
the total unemployment allowance increases.  In the case of an increase in the probability 
of detection in Department 2, because of the decrease in unemployed native workers, both 
the  total amount and  the  average income of native lower income groups will be 
increased.
3  In the case of an increase in the probability of detection in Department 1, on 
the other hand, the number of unemployed native workers does not always decrease.  As a 
result, employers should reward efforts to detect shirking workers in Department 2 in 
order to improve the economic welfare of native workers.  
 
3.2 An increase in internal or border enforcement policy 
The effects of an increase in q on the employment and wage rate of native workers are as 
follows: 
 

















dL U .   (14) 
 
The effects of strengthened internal enforcement are quite similar to those caused 
by strengthened detection of shirking in Department 2.  There is only one difference.  
Detection of shirking has a negative effect on the wage rate of natives, but, on the other 
hand, because internal enforcement targets illegal foreign workers only, a decrease in 
foreign workers in Department 2 has a positive effect on wages.  Therefore, for native   14
workers the internal enforcement policy is greatly preferable to the detection of shirking 
workers in Department 2.  Moreover, the effects of a strengthened border enforcement 
policy are quite similar  
A strengthening of  internal or border enforcement policy reduces the number of 
illegal foreign workers, but the employment of native workers in Department 2 increases.  
This decreases the numbers employed and unemployed in Department 1.  The level of 
employment in Department 2 also decreases because the number of additional native 
workers who are employed in it does not suffice to compensate for the number of illegal 
foreign workers who have been deported.  Therefore, the wage rates in both departments 
increase, and increased wages guarantee larger unemployment allowances.  Though the 
level of employment decreases in Department 1 (the department with the highest wage), 
excluding illegal foreign workers (since they are complementary to native workers), it has 
positive effects on the economic welfare of native workers because of higher wages, 
higher unemployment allowances and higher employment than before.  This explains 
why the government of the host country dares to make those workers illegal and tries to 
expose them. 
 
3.3 An increase in income tax 
The effects of an increase in  t on the employment and wage rate of native workers are as 
follows:  
   15

















dL U .  (15) 
An increase in income tax increases the wage rates of both departments to maintain 
the real incomes of workers and therefore reduces the level of employment.  As more 
natives are unemployed, the per-capita unemployment allowance does not necessarily 
increase. 
 
3.4 An increase in the inflow of legal foreign worker. 
The effects of an increase in 
M L  on the employment and wage rate of native workers are 
as follows: 
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.  (16) 
 
By increasing legal foreign workers who are substitutable for native workers, the 
opportunity of employment for native workers decreases because of competition.  
However, on the other hand,  an  increased total  number of workers causes  greater 
employment and smaller unemployment allowances, in equilibrium.  Therefore, we 
cannot predict whether the number of employed native workers in Department 1 will 
increase or not.  However, we predict that the number of unemployed native workers 
should decrease because of expansion of employment in Department 2. 













  (17) 
 
and, therefore, because of increased employment in Department 1 and an increased total 
number of legal foreign workers, the number of employed legal foreign workers should 
increase but the level of unemployment would be ambiguous. 
In our model, the number of illegal foreign workers is determined endogenously by 
(4), so there is no difference between the effects of  introducing more legal foreign 
workers and those of legitimizing illegal workers who are already in the host country. 
We now assert the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1  
(i)  In Case 1, in which illegal foreign workers who are complementary to the native 
workers are well controlled and are all employed in Department 2 along with  native 
workers, adopting a stricter border or internal enforcement policy that excludes illegal 
foreign workers may be the optimal policy for native workers because it results in a 
higher level of  employment  for them, larger wages in both departments and  greater 
unemployment allowances. 
(ii)  Although legal foreign workers are substitutable for native workers, increasing their 
numbers may have the effect of reducing total unemployment among the natives.  
   17
4.  Case 2: The number of illegal workers cannot be controlled 
We consider the case where the flood of illegal foreign workers is so powerful that any 
preventative policies, such as border enforcement, cannot control their inflow to the host 
country.  Provided condition (3) holds, the number of illegal foreign workers increases 
and all of the workers in Department 2 will be illegal foreigners.  If the government of the 
host country intends to detect and deport illegal immigrants, all it has to do is arrest all the 
workers in Department 2.  However, more illegal immigration will  immediately occur 
and the government’s efforts at internal enforcement will therefore be in vain.  Then the 
government will renounce policies preventing illegal foreign workers, and as a result we 











w w + = .   (19) 
 
Both native workers and legal foreign workers are either employed in Department 1 
or unemployed.  As in case 1, the law of probability determines who will be employed.  




1 L L L
M = + ,  (20) 
M M
U
M L L L = + 1 ,  (21)   18
0 0 0
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.  (24) 
 
Illegal foreign workers try to immigrate until their expected income in the host 





2 / w L L w
I = ,  (25) 
 
where  2 L L
I >  and some illegal foreign workers are unemployed and their incomes are 
assumed to be zero. 




1 w FL = ,  (26) 
*
2
2 w FL = .  (27) 
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Additionally, in case 2 there is no exploitation by employers employing illegal foreign 
workers. 
Now we have 10 equations, (17)–(26).  If  , , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 p p L N g g t M  and 
* w  are 








U  and 
I L  will be 
determined endogenously. 
 
4.1 An increase in the probability of detection 
The effects of an increase in  i p  on the employment and wage rate of native workers are 
as follows: 
 















dL U ,  (28) 















dL U .  (29) 
 
An increase in the probability of the detection of shirking workers in Department 1 
will reduce the wage rate and expand total employment in the department.  The number of 
unemployed workers decreases and unemployed allowances increase.  This conclusion is 
similar  to that of  Case 1.  However,  in Department 2 there are no employed native 
workers and therefore an increase in the probability of detection does not affect native 
workers. 
   20
4.2 An increase in income tax 
The effects of an increase in  t on the employment and wage rate of native workers are as 
follows: 
 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0
1
0 0








dL U   (30) 
 
An increase in income tax should increase the wage rate in Department 1 to 
maintain the real incomes of the workers and, therefore, should reduce the number 
employed in the department.  Because of an  increased number of unemployed native 
workers, per-capita unemployment allowances do not always increase.  These results are 
also similar to those of Case 1. 
 
4.3 An increase in the inflow of legal foreign worker 
The effects of an increase in 
M L  on the employment and wage rate of native workers are 
as follows: 
  
0 , 0 , 0 , 0
1
0 0











.  (31) 
 
By increasing the number of legal foreign workers, who are substitutable for native 
workers, the opportunity of employment for native workers decreases.  On the other hand,   21
an  increased total supply o f workers causes  greater employment and smaller 
unemployment allowances than before.  Therefore, we cannot  predict whether the 
number of employed native workers in Department 1 will increase or not, as in Case 1.  
However, as native workers  are never employed in Department 2, it is  ambiguous 
whether the number of unemployed native workers decreases or not.  Conversely, 
adopting a policy of excluding legal foreign workers has an effect on both the wage rates 
and unemployment allowances of native workers and, moreover,  there is still the 
possibility of reducing the unemployment of native workers.  A decrease in the inflow of 
legal foreign workers is profitable for native workers, which differs from Case 1. 
As analysed above, the optimal policy for native workers in Case 2 is to restrict the 
number of  legal foreign workers, 
M L , and the second-best policy  is one of stricter 
detection of shirking workers.  The former policy, at least, guarantees higher wages and 
unemployment allowances and, moreover, it may  result in  greater employment.  
Adopting the latter policy is beneficial to unemployed workers because it expands the 
opportunity for employment and increases unemployment allowances. 
We now assert the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 
(i)  In case 2, in which illegal foreign workers, who are complementary to native workers, 
are free to immigrate, the optimal policy for native workers is to restrict legal foreign 
workers who are substitutable for native workers.   22
(ii)  With regard to the income redistribution policy, more strictly detecting shirking 
workers in Department 1 is also preferable. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
We conclude that introducing foreign workers who are complementary to native workers 
should be made illegal because of their harmful influence.  In the case where some illegal 
foreign workers are employed in Department 2 along with native workers, the optimal 
policy to accomplish greater employment, wage rates, and unemployment allowances is 
to restrict illegal foreign workers by introducing or strengthening border or internal 
enforcement policies.  On the other hand, legal foreign workers, who are substitutable for 
native workers, should be introduced to reduce the total number of unemployed native 
workers.  This conclusion seems to be paradoxical because legal foreign workers are 
usually welcomed by developed countries, but with  illegal workers, precautions are 
usually taken because of their competitive ability. 
However, once restrictive policies become unworkable and illegal foreign workers 
can migrate freely, all the jobs in Department 2 will be occupied by illegal workers.  In 
this case, the optimal policy of the host country is to restrict legal foreign workers. 
There are issues for further study.  Firstly, we assume international capital mobility, 
and, therefore, we do not consider the economic welfare of native capital owners.  It may 
be worthwhile to investigate the case without international capital mobility.  Secondly, 
instead of a one-good model, the extension to two goods (one of which is non-tradable),   23
similar to that of  River-Batiz (1982), should be studied.  Thirdly, instead of  using an 
efficiency wage model, the reason why  the wage rates for illegal foreign workers are 
smaller than those for natives may be attributed to the penalty fines that employers must 
pay if the illegal workers are detected by the government.  Fourthly, there are some 
limitations in the static model we adopt, so an approach, similar to that of Carter (1999), 
of  introducing a dynamic programming model should be useful  for considering the 
possibility of a worker’s losing one job and finding another. 
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Notes 
1 It may be more realistic to assume that the wage rate in the home country is related to the 
number of emigrants.  To simplify our analysis, we assume that the home country is large 
enough to permit the assumption that 
* w  is constant and independent of 
M L  and 
I L . 
2 We assume that one good is produced in the two departments, so the following two 
equations should be satisfied: 
. 1 ) ( ) (
, 1 ) ( ) (
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
= +
= +
r r w a w r w a
r r w a w r w a
K L
K L  
From (2), we obtain  i w  and, by the free movement of capital,  i r  should be fixed.  Making 
use of the production functions,  i L  will be obtained.   24
 
3 In our model, we can conclude that  0




, namely, the economic advantage of 
being employed in Department 2 rather than being unemployed decreases as the income 
tax rate increases.  We ignore the possibility of workers in either department changing 
jobs.  However,  if we assume that  N  is sufficiently small, and if we assume that 
unemployed workers have more chance of being employed in Department 1 than workers 
employed in Department 2, then the disadvantage of being unemployed should be less for 
a native worker. 
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